Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities
March 5, 1975
NOTICE TO CORRESPONDENTS
Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on intelligence activities, announced this morning
that the Committee's scheduled meeting today, Wednesday,
March 5, has been cancelled.
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Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities
March 4, 1975
NOTICE TO CORRESPONDENTS
Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Select Committee
on intelligence activities, announced today that the Committee will
meet Wednesday, March 5, at 2 p.m. in Room 3302 of the Dirksen Senate
Office Building.
The meeting will be closed; however, a press conference will
follow.
*
Senator Church and Senator John Tower, vice chairman of the
Committee, are tentatively scheduled to meet at 10 a.m. Wednesday,
March 5, with President Ford at the White House. The Senators
and the President will be discussing cooperation between the
Administration and the Committee.
11 March 1975
The Honorable Frank Church
Chairman
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This letter will confirm and reduce to writing some
of the matters agreed upon at our recent meeting.
At the outset, I should like to express my deep
personal appreciation for the candor and helpfulness of
you and Senator Tower in that meeting and for your
sensitivity to the respective responsibilities under our
Constitutional framework of the Select Committee and the
Central Intelligence Agency in the area of your review.
For my part, I should like to renew again, for myself and
the CIA, my promise of cooperation with respect to the
important work of the Select Committee. In my judgment,
a spirit of good faith and cooperative effort is not only
necessary to enable your Committee to discharge its
responsibilities fully and expeditiously, but is indeed in
the best interests of the intelligence community as well.
I am convinced that a responsible and thorough review of
U.S. intelligence activities will serve to vindicate the
CIA and enhance the public's understanding of the important
contribution that the intelligence efforts of this nation
can make toward the goal of preserving and strengthening
our democracy.
SBmteb States: Senate
MEMORANDUM
Released to press
March 12, 1975
approximately 5:30 EST
following press conference
-3-
It is my desire that the secrecy agreements signed by
our employees shall not impair the necessary work of the
Select Committee. To accomplish this, and in recognition
of the security protection contemplated by the Select
Committee, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise
protected information to the Select Committee or its designated
staff members will constitute an authorized provision of infor-
mation within the meaning of the secrecy agreements. This
letter may be used to indicate such authorization for any
Agency employee or ex-employee to furnish information to
the Select Committee or appropriate staff members on matters
which would otherwise be covered by their secrecy agreement,
but which are not among the particularly sensitive matters
such as mentioned above. With respect to those particularly
sensitive matters, different procedures are obviously neces-
sary. Accordingly, where any matter included in these sensi-
tive categories would be involved in responding to the Com-
mittee, the employee should express his concern and, if
possible, propose a way of responding to the Committee without
exposing such sensitive details. If the Committee believes
that a disclosure of those aspects is nevertheless necessary,
the matter will be discussed between the Committee and the
Agency. I am prepared to consult with the Committee at any
time to avoid difficulties in this area and quickly determine
together the appropriate course of action to be taken.
With the good faith evident in our discussions on these
matters, I believe that these arrangements will enable me to
discharge my responsibilities to protect intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure, while at the same
time to provide the Select Committee with all the information
it needs to accomplish its task.
As we have agreed, it is in the national interest as well
as that of the Select Committee and the U.S. intelligence
community to ensure that your review proceed as smoothly and
as expeditiously as possible. Toward that end, I have in-
structed all CIA personnel to respond in a spirit of coopera-
tion.
Sincerely,
-2-
I am particularly appreciative of your recognition
that certain sensitive aspects of our intelligence
activities must receive special consideration and treatment
by the Select Committee in the course of your work. As we
discussed, such matters as the identities of our sensitive
sources, the material provided to us by cooperating foreign
k intelligence services, the details of technical devices and
systems and of operational methods, the identities of certain
of our employees who could be targets of kidnapping or
assassination, the identities of American citizens and
organizations who have cooperated with U.S. intelligence, and
some additional materials the public disclosure of which would
create serious foreign policy or national security problems,
should be protected not only from exposure, but indeed from
the risk of exposure. We should also work together to protect
certain other information which, if improperly disclosed,
might impair the privacy rights of individuals. Where these
kinds of considerations are present, I anticipate that appro-
priate understandings can be arrived at to avoid the risk of
exposing such matters and at the same time to satisfy the
Select Committee's need for a full understanding of our
activities.
As I stated to you, employees of the Central Intelligence
Agency will be available to the Select Committee for staff
interviews and for testimony. As we have discussed, this
might require, in some circumstances, special arrangements to
( protect the identity of particular employees whose physical
safety or future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure.
I anticipate that suitable safeguards can be established to
avoid such dangers. I assume the Committee will make its own
arrangements with respect to ex-employees as to whom I no
longer have the authority to direct their cooperation. However,
I am available for whatever assistance I can provide in this
regard.
As you are aware, all employees of the Central Intelligence
Agency are required to sign a secrecy agreement when they enter
on duty. This is a condition of employment, and it requires
that they keep forever secret all classified information gained
during the course of their employment. The secrecy agreement
further requires that they may not disclose classified informa-
tion, either orally or by publication, without prior authoriza-
tion from the Director of Central Intelligence. Under the
secrecy agreement, an employee's obligations with respect to
the protection of classified information continue after his
employment with the CIA has been terminated.
I
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The cooperative spirit of our relationship with the Committee
and its Staff must at the same time take account of the rights of
Agency employees. The Committee Staff has agreed to advise
employees of their Constitutional rights at the beginning of any
interview or other appearance.
( ...... .
When a current Agency employee is selected to be interviewed
by the Select Committee Staff, the Staff Director or Chief Counsel will
normally notify Mr. John M". Clarke, who is my principal liaison with '
the Committee and its Staff. Mr. Clarke, in turn, will notify the em- j
ployee. The purpose of this is in no way to inhibit the work of the Com-
mittee. It is intended to allow time for the employee to gain general
legal guidance if he wants it, and to obtain security guidance from an
appropriate senior officer. |
My own belief is that after a careful review of all U.S. intelli-
gence activities, the Committee will address needed legislative changes
and will reaffirm their confidence in the importance and contribution
of U.S. intelligence programs.
W. E. Colby
Director
Attachment: a/s
DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES
EMPLOYEE
BULLETIN
Senate Select Committee To Review
U.S. Intelligence Activities
Senate Resolution 21 established a Select Committee of the
Senate to review U.S. intelligence activities. The Resolution calls
for a comprehensive review of the total U. S. intelligence effort
and is not restricted to the recent charges and allegations against
CIA alone. Consequently, it is likely to be far-ranging in its
impact. \
It is in all of our interests to see that the Select Committee
receives full understanding of our activities and their contribution
to the country as expeditiously as possible. I have every confidence
that the inquiry will be responsible, and constructive, and
will produce new •understanding of, and improvements in, the Ameri-
can intelligence system.
It is with this conviction that I have pledged my personal coop-
eration and that of the CIA. I have advised Senators Church and
Tower, the Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman, that employees
of the CIA will be available to the Select Committee for Staff inter-
views and for testimony. We are working with the Committee Staff
to design procedures to facilitate their work in examining topics of
concern.
Attached to this bulletin is a letter which I have sent to Senator
Church. To facilitate the necessary work of the Committee and in recog-
nition of the security protection contemplated by the Committee, I
have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information
to the Select Committee or its designated Staff members will constitute
authorized provision of information within the meaning of the Secrecy
Agreements signed by each CIA employee, subject to the special
procedures and limitations set forth in the letter regarding particularly
sensitive matters. Senator Church has agreed that reference to sen-
sitive data in any Committee report will be subject to consultation
between the Committee and the Agency.
Mr. William Colby-
Page Two
March 12, 1975
I welcome these first steps in close cooperation and hope that
it forecasts an expeditious and thorough inquiry that will result in
the strengthening of our nation's intelligence activities under the
law.
Sincerely,
Prank Church
Chairman
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS. VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MO.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
QlCwHcb
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
SELECT COM MITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
March 12, 1975
Mr. William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. Colby:
On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, I want to thank
your for your letter of March 11, and the copy of the Employee Bulletin
you have issued to all CIA employees. As we jointly recognize, in
order for the Committee to carry out a thorough inquiry, in accordance
with the mandate contained in S. Res. 21, the Agency's full cooperation
will be necessary. Your recognition that our mandate authorizes all,
past and present, agency employees to cooperate fully, and without
impediment due to secrecy agreements, will serve to facilitate our
expeditious collection of material relative to that mandate.
I particularly appreciate your statement recognizing our security
precautions. Ah you know, your staff was very helpful to the Committee's
staff in designing those precautions.
The Staff Director and the Chief Counsel will, under the direction
of the Committee, notify Mr. John Clarke of the members of the Committee
who have been designated to carry out studies, inquiries and investigations
required to meet the tasks specified in S. Res. 21.
It is the Committee's understanding that the members of the Committee
and designated staff will have access to any and all information which
the Committee determines is necessary for its inquiry. We recognize,
however, that the Committee inquiry may touch on sensitive areas, such
as the identity of CIA personnel, sources, or cooperating organizations
whose disclosure could place persons in actual jeopardy. In the event
that the Committee inquiry touches on such sensitive areas, which matters
we have already discussed in our meeting of February 27, we should discuss
jointly, and as you suggest quickly, what procedures might be followed
should the Committee decide it requires more information in these specific
areas.
Frank and Bethine Church Digital Collection
